



COP26

TIME

TO ACT!

DEMANDS FOR THE COP26 BY KLIMADELEGATION E. V.

Klimadelegation e. V.

Klimadelegation e.V. is a German Youth Climate NGO. As one voice of the younger and future generations we call for global and intergenerational climate justice! We are an accredited member of the official international youth representation YOUNGO (Youth NGOs), member of the Climate Action Network (CAN) Europe and the Klima-Allianz Deutschland. Our young civil society observers have been attending the United Nations climate conferences for almost 10 years. We are advocating for ambitious climate action and climate justice amongst generations and regions of the world.

In preparation of the UN Climate Change Conference 2021 (COP 26), we provide the following advice and demands to decision makers, media and press, the general public and the climate movement for a safe and healthy future of humanity and life on our planet.

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List of Abbreviations

ACE	Action for Climate Empowerment
BIPoC	Black, Indigenous, People of Colour
CAN	Climate Action Network
CBDRRRC	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
COP26	26th Conference of the Parties
EU	European Union
FLINTA*	female, lesbians, inter, non-binary, trans, agender
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GHG	Greenhouse Gas Emissions
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
L&D	Loss and Damage
LCIPP	Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LEG	Least Developed Countries Expert Group
ME	monitor and evaluate
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NDC	National Determined Contribution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NWP	Nairobi Work Programme
SCF	Special Climate Change Fund
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage
YOUNGO	Youth Non-Governmental Organisations

Executive Summary

1 Background

1.1 It is time to deliver - COP26 is the place to do so

After two years, the global community will finally reassemble at the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP). From October 31 to November 12 2021, governmental representatives, members of civil society, the scientific community and many more will **gather in Glasgow in order to tackle the global climate crisis**. Climate action is more urgent than ever as the climate crisis rises to a new high and threatens every region of our world now. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that **current pathways will reach or exceed the 1.5 °C limit within the next 20 years unless rapid and large-scale reductions are undertaken** (see IPCC 2021: 40). The climate crisis is already destroying the livelihoods of large sections of the population in countries of the Global South. Also the Global North is affected, as more intensive and frequent floods and droughts in Germany have been showing recently.

There is little time left to prevent more irreversible damage. But it is not too late if large-scale reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will be made possible by political will and action immediately. Parties at COP26 are responsible to answer important questions in consensus for facilitating a just and holistic global socio-ecological transition towards a pathway that limits global temperature rise to 1.5 °C and reaches carbon neutrality in 2050. To fulfill this ambition, Parties need to work hand in hand with observer groups. We demand that **signatories of the Paris Agreement respect their commitments and prevent global warming beyond 1.5 °C** for a climate-just future. 'It's time to deliver – COP26 is the place to do so' (UNFCCC 2021b).

1.2 The EU and Germany need to take the lead!

As a German Youth Climate NGO we specifically demand **accountability from the German Federal Government and the European Union (EU) for their past and current actions**. While we acknowledge that the climate crisis needs collective action, we underline that especially states with high historic emissions, high levels of wealth and with a large share of current emissions need to show solidarity by delivering their fair share of domestic actions as well as support abroad. For this reason, **the EU and Germany are required to live up to their responsibility**.

Until the first quarter of the twentieth century, Europe has historically been the biggest emitter (see Friedlingstein u. a. 2020; Ritchie 2019). Today the EU-27 is still on the third rank of GHG-Emitters (see Friedlingstein u. a. 2020) and **Germany should use its important role within the EU to show true leadership with regards to the COP26**. The argument that Germany is a small nation that is only responsible for 2% of global emissions is brought forward frequently, attempting to relativize Germany's actual power of action on climate protection. On the contrary, as a wealthy industrial nation Germany stands on rank 6 of the major GHG-emitters world-wide, while our per capita emissions are nearly double than the global average and even higher when emissions from imports are included (see Worldometer 2016). This means that **Germany finally needs to become a climate action frontrunner and live up to its international commitments**.

1.3 Climate justice now!

The excessive historical and current greenhouse gas emissions of the Global North disproportionately affect countries of the Global South and future generations. These injustices are rooted in carbon-intensive production and consumption, in a history of colonialism and exploitation and therefore impose a prior responsibility on the Global North to bear the damage and curb emissions as fast as possible. Intergenerational and social injustices (across and within countries) need to be thoroughly taken into consideration by decision makers, so that policies should be implemented with respect to coming generations and long-term planning horizons.

We demand that intergenerational and social injustices are being thoroughly taken into consideration by decision makers, so that policies should be implemented with respect to coming generations and long-term planning horizons.

In recognition that the threats posed by the climate crisis are a consequence of unequal, colonial, economic and social power relations, a climate just future requires a far-reaching restructuring of wealth and power as well as the end of all mechanisms of domination, discrimination and suppression. **There is no climate justice without social justice, intergenerational equity, and gender justice.**

On this basis we demand that decision makers consider the following principles as cornerstones of their policy making and negotiations:

-  The **representation** of people affected by structural and intersectional discrimination, through measures aimed at proportional, fair representation and appropriate toward differentiated demands of disadvantaged groups¹
-  The **prioritization** of the needs and demands of most affected people and areas (MAPA) by the climate crisis and by structural exploitation must have priority in climate-related decisions.
-  Climate policies should **foster equity, including intergenerational equity** and counteract neo-colonial exploitation and hierarchical North-South relations and dependencies.
-  Decisions must be taken in the spirit of **solidarity** between regions and generations.
-  The main polluting countries and companies must take financial and social responsibility. The **polluters pay principle and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities** must form the foundation of political considerations.
-  **Scientific findings** and especially the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports must serve as a central basis for decisions.
-  Include diverse perspectives in scientific analysis. In addition to Western-based science, **indigenous and local knowledge** and diverse knowledge systems should be included in the IPCC and as a basis for decision-making.
-  To tackle multiple complex crises, policy making should follow a **holistic approach e.g. jointly consider** ecological, animal and human health, as well as **foster global cooperation and collaborations.**






¹Such as FLINTA persons (women/female, lesbians, inter. trans, agender) as well as the LGBTQIA+ community, BIPOC, people with disabilities and otherwise disadvantaged groups, youth and future generations.

2 Core Demands



2.1 Long term targets and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) Enhancement

Context: Parties agreed to increase their NDCs as part of the Global Stocktake at COP26. So far, many countries did not update their commitments or did not raise ambitions. Hence, 'nations must urgently redouble their climate efforts if they are to prevent global temperature rises beyond the Paris Agreement's goal of well below 2 °C – ideally 1.5 °C' (UNFCCC 2021b).




No more empty targets

-  We demand that Parties agree on a conclusive and transparent definition of "net zero" and the scope of emission reductions (which gases, which sectors, when to be reached, which approach: reduction, removal or offsetting).
-  We demand that net zero targets should include all sectors and gases, especially external ones from aviation and shipping
-  Parties also should be required to indicate on what basis they consider their long term targets to be adequate and fair.
-  We urge Parties to outline concrete steps, implementation pathways and interim milestones to achieving net zero.
-  We call upon Parties to ensure that commitments are legally binding, regularly reviewed and transparent, as well as aligned with national policies.

Global Efforts are still far from enough

-  We demand new and updated NDCs, from all signatories to the Paris Agreement that are consistent with the 1.5 °C limit and fulfill the long-term goals.
-  We demand high ambitions especially from historic and current big emitter countries to finally fulfill their responsibility.


Comprehensiveness of NDCs

-  We demand that NDCs make clear references to countries' adaptation efforts, measures to build resilience and actions to support adaptation, loss and damage in developing countries.
-  We demand that NDCs include mitigation-adaptation co-benefits and include reference to achieving finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development.
-  We urge Parties to establish clear links should be made between the actions outlined in NDCs and other policy documents and strategies.
-  We argue based on Art. 2 of the Paris Agreement, that NDCs should make clear references on how they plan to implement the Paris Agreement based on the principles of equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC).





The EU's NDCs

-  We urge the EU to adjust its NDC to reflect its fair share of global effort and be in line with the 1.5 °C limit, which needs to be reconsidered and substantiated.
-  We demand that all member states of the EU implement the 'fit for 55%' programme in their national policies.
-  We underline that the EU emission reduction pathways need to be much steeper in order to be compatible with the principle of climate justice in order to mitigate global inequalities.
-  We demand from the German Government to put in place sufficient policies in place to achieve the 1.5 °C limit.
-  We demand from the German Government to serve as a leader within the EU and for all the 'big emitter countries' especially in their role as the G7 presidency in 2022 to drive a radical change towards more climate action.




Common Timeframes for NDCs

-  We demand that the Parties agree to a singular five-year common time frame for the implementation of NDCs.

Global Stocktake (GST)

-  We demand that non-party stakeholders and observer organisations should be able to participate in the GST in a more substantial way: They should be able to give input and be included in the succeeding discussions (see Climate Action Network 2021b).
-  We demand that input to the GST should be accepted in at least all UN languages.
-  We demand that the GST should not only consist of quantitative but also qualitative inputs, best practices, lessons learned, success stories and gaps.
-  We demand an increase of financial and staff capacities of the Secretariat to accompany the process more comprehensively and supportively.





Practical steps towards more ambitious NDCs

-  We demand that net zero targets should include all sectors and gases, especially external ones from aviation and shipping.
-  We demand that all countries must cancel their coal construction plans as well as their plans for new gas pipelines now.
-  We demand that global coal emissions should peak in 2020, global coal use in electricity generation must fall by 80% below 2010 levels by 2030, all OECD nations, including Germany should end coal use entirely by 2030, and all coal-fired power stations must be shut by 2040 at latest (see Yanguas Parra u. a. 2019: 3).




2.2 Adaptation

Context: The need for adaptation to the climate crisis is present everywhere, but varies locally. The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) aims to enhance resilience, reduce vulnerability and ensure adaptation; the Adaptation Committee is currently outlining how to monitor and evaluate (M&E) progress towards it. The Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) strives to assist all and particularly developing countries (esp. LDC, SIDS) to improve their understanding of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, and to make informed decisions on practical adaptation actions.




Adaptation Action

-  We support the increasing emphasis on locally led adaptation and demand that this needs to be driven by the most-vulnerable communities and encourage local leadership.
-  We demand that adaptation actions should be gender- transformative, human-rights based and people-centered, especially taking into account the needs of the most vulnerable populations.
-  We demand more discussion on how to improve access to funding, capacity, technology and information at the lowest appropriate level.
-  We demand that Parties agree on concrete ways to accelerate adaptation action, for instance through a task force on National Adaptation Plans to tackle some of the main challenges currently faced by state and civil stakeholders.






Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)

-  We request that M&E towards achieving the GGA is designed participatory, locally led and people-centered with regards to those who are most vulnerable.
-  We request that a larger variety of quantitative and qualitative methods be used to understand the impacts of different adaptation enhancing activities e.g. knowledge sharing, information gathering, such as stakeholder dialogues and targeted surveys with government institutions.
-  We believe that progress should be evaluated in the context of the current climate crisis expectations to avoid overestimations.

Informed decisions on adaptation through the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP)

-  We demand that inclusivity, accessibility and transparency must be imperative both to the preparation and conduction of the NWP stocktake at COP26.
-  We demand that the NWP stocktaking is accompanied by a submission process to allow inputs from different stakeholders facilitated through guiding questions, indicators and dialogues (possibly regional) with experts and civil society in the run up to SBSTA56.
-  We request the inclusion of indigenous and local knowledge, on-the-ground CSOs (Civil Society Organisations), partner organizations and marginalized groups such as women, children and youth so their engagement and input on experiences of working with Parties through the NWP is proactively promoted.




Human mobility as an adaptation strategy

-  We request that Parties recognize human mobility as a necessary adaptation strategy.
-  We request that policies, including national adaptation plans, take into account the different contexts and types of human mobility.
-  Adaptation plans should reduce pressure on vulnerable populations to avoid displacement and the need for planned resettlement, while allowing for the participation of affected communities
-  We call on Parties to build their capacity to manage migration, displacement and planned re-settlement.
-  We call for the building of institutions and frameworks that broaden the criteria for refugees so that affected people have a valid claim to refugee status, and that facilitate the movement of people across borders.




2.3 Loss and Damage (L&D)

Context: L&D refers to adverse effects of the climate crisis, both sudden onset events and slow onset processes. L&D is an issue of climate justice, because most affected communities often have the least emissions and also the least resources to build resilience. Financial needs for L&D in the Global South are estimated to be in the hundred billions, increasing annually (see Schäfer u. a. 2019: 8). Climate justice requires large emitters to support the most vulnerable.




Big Emitters' financial liability for damages caused by fossil fuel consumption!

-  We demand that the economic and non-economic needs resulting from L&D in the most vulnerable countries and communities are met by Parties, especially from the Global North in accordance with the Polluters Pay principle, by adequate and needs-based public finance.
-  We request that the funding for L&D has to be provided additionally to existing finance pledges for mitigation and adaptation and proportionately to financiers own historic and ongoing emissions.
-  We demand that Youth plays a vital role in all discussions on L&D, e.g. via a climate reparations task force (see Loss and Damage Youth Coalition 2019) since young and future generations will be most impacted by the climate crisis.



The Santiago Network (SNLD) must be fully operationalized at COP26!

-  We urge the parties to fully operationalize the SNLD, i.e. with its own secretariat and funding.
-  We support the suggestions put forward by the cross constituency call for action: 'Parties must ensure that the SNLD delivers functions [...] based on the most prevalent challenges and gaps that developing countries face, including a lack of capacity, [...] of finance and support' (see Climate Action Network 2021a).
-  We suggest mandating an annual Technical Expert Meeting on L&D at the intersessional negotiations.

Strengthen the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for more transparency and accountability

-  We demand to strengthen the mandate of the WIM, its facilitating and capacity-building efforts and institutional arrangements.
-  We demand that Parties commission the Executive Committee of the WIM to compile a bi-annual report on the current L&D finance gap that offers the necessary transparency.
-  We demand that L&D becomes a permanent agenda item in all negotiations.





Time to address all L&D!

-  We demand that non-financial losses, e.g. loss of culture and knowledge, human death and suffering, as well as migration due to climate change have to become a core component of L&D considerations.
-  We urge Parties to address slow onset processes more prominently in the political discussions as they are responsible for immense L&D.




2.4 Climate Finance

Context: So-called developed countries promised to mobilize US \$100 billion annually by 2020 to support climate action in developing countries. That commitment has not yet been fulfilled and is far from reach (see United Nations 2020: 21 ff.).



Increase Climate Finance, reach \$100 Billion each year and more!

-  We urge Parties to finally meet and exceed the \$100 billion by this year's COP26.
-  We request the German Government to increase their public climate finance to their fair share of \$8 billion per year.
-  We demand that the financial resources for mitigation and adaptation are balanced equally.
-  We demand to increase climate finance from additional public and private sources, excluding loans with unproportionally high interest rates.





Make climate finance reliable, predictable and fair!

-  Financial measures can under no circumstances exacerbate the debt burden emerging countries are already carrying today.
-  We call upon Parties to agree on a global comprehensive definition of climate finance, especially to differentiate it from so-called development finance².
-  We urge Parties to increase transparency in reporting on climate finance in terms of the composition of existing and additional payments.






²So called development finance is to be viewed critically, since through this term a western-dominated model is generalized which reinforces a neocolonial world order.

-  We urge industrialized countries to increase and ensure reliability and predictability of financing provided. In this context the EU should develop comprehensive regulations for long-term climate financing.
-  We call for an increase of climate finance after the expiration of the current goals in 2025, based on a realistic estimate of costs for mitigation and adaptation efforts, as well as addressing losses and damages.




Climate finance must serve global climate justice!




-  We demand that climate finance mechanisms be gender-responsive and build on human rights.
-  We request that climate finance reduces inequalities and empowers disadvantaged populations by financial redistribution on a global level.
-  We demand to compensate climate debts in the sense of an overuse of emissions and climate damage caused by the Global North to the Global South.
-  We are calling on parties for efforts to make the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism more accessible, inclusive and transparent, including through further engagement with observers.

Private sector climate finance needs to increase, divestment from fossil fuels is overdue!

-  We call for immediate divestments from fossil fuels and any activity related to neo-classical resource extraction while redistributing finance in favor of climate justice.
-  We demand the private actors like investment banks, private investors and so-called development banks to significantly increase their climate finance portfolio and invest in mitigation and adaptation, as well as in dealing with L&D.
-  We demand that banks at the same time divest from fossil fuels and from any activity related to neo-colonial extractivism of resources.
-  Private actors must raise internal awareness of employees and leaders.
-  We encourage related bodies like the Special Climate Change Fund (SCF), Green Climate Fund (GCF), Green Environment Facility (GEF) to host public-private dialogues to explore synergies.

Bounce back better and greener!




-  We as societies should not just recover to “same business as usual”, but bounce back better and greener.
-  We demand from governments that all financing is aligned with climate protection, just and green transitions.
-  We urge that guidelines for green recovery are developed globally, while countries in the Global North must take the lead in providing green investments and transforming production and consumption justly.

-  We call for countries to agree on a regular, transparent and long-term documentation of the global progress of green recovery.
-  We request to discuss green recovery in a diverse and multilateral way taking into account different regional circumstances with a special focus on the differences between countries of the Global South and the Global North.
-  We call for COP26 to advocate that all recovery actions after the pandemic must be in line with the Paris Agreement.









2.5 Article 6

Context: Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity. For this purpose it establishes bilateral and multilateral market-based (Article 6.2 and 6.4) and non-market mechanisms (Article 6.8) (see UNFCCC 2015a: 4 f.).


Human rights and sustainable development

-  We demand that projects under Article 6 protect and do not violate human and especially indigenous rights.
-  We call for the active participation of indigenous and local communities in project development.
-  We request to plan projects under Article 6 holistically benefitting people, biodiversity and climate.

Environmental integrity

-  We demand that environmental integrity must be ensured so that Article 6 can substantially contribute to a below 1.5 °C world.
-  We demand that the following requirements are met for agreements concerning bilateral mechanisms under Art. 6.2 and multilateral mechanisms under Art. 6.4:
 -  No double counting of emission reductions
 -  No trading of savings that would have been realized anyway
 -  It must be avoided that countries keep their NDCs artificially low
 -  A smooth transition from the Clean Development Mechanism
 -  A 50% cancellation rate of past traded emissions certificates so market mechanisms under 6.2 and 6.4 contribute to the Overall Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (OMGE)
-  We demand that market mechanisms as a whole should be subject to strict regulations.

Non-market mechanisms

-  We call for specific non-market based cooperation under Article 6.8 to contribute to additional climate finance and in particular adaptation finance. Article 6.8 should actively promote synergies with other sustainability goals.

Adaptation finance through Article 6.6

- 👉 We call for at least 10 % of the proceeds from carbon credits issued for an Art. 6.2 or Art. 6.4 project activity, as well as the surpluses from administrative expenditures, to be channelled into adaptation finance.

2.6 Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)

Context: All elements of ACE (education, training, public access to information, public awareness, public participation, and international cooperation) are key for democratic and inclusive climate action. The Doha Work Programme (DWP) has been reviewed recently because Parties have committed to continue and improve it at COP26.

Towards an enhanced work program

- 👉 We ask COP26 to build on the SBI Chair's and the Co-Facilitator's review of the DWP to recall stakeholders' input and agree on a new program.
- 👉 We suggest that the new work program follows an 8-year timeframe with a mid-term review in coherence with existing international programmes (e.g. the SDGs and NDCs) so all relevant information will be present for upcoming decisions in 2030.

Prioritize ACE in national policy

- 👉 We request that national plans and binding goals are equipped with internationally agreed upon metrics for tracking implementation and reporting progress.
- 👉 We demand ACE to be a cross-cutting priority in climate policy and action, facilitated by national mechanisms and institutional coordination.

Harmonizing ACE at multiple levels






- 👉 We support a long-term vision underlined by short-term action plans towards transformational capacity building based on science and human rights.

Always integrate youth

- 👉 We ask to include Youth at levels of engagement and discussion around ACE as we are part of the ones to be empowered.
- 👉 We ask Parties to consider the proposals of the ACE Youth Forum 2021 (see ACE Youth Forum 2020).

Always integrate youth





- 👉 We ask to include Youth at levels of engagement and discussion around ACE as we are part of the ones to be empowered.
- 👉 We ask Parties to consider the proposals of the ACE Youth Forum 2021 (see ACE Youth Forum 2020):
 - 👉 a global action plan for the new work program

-  an ACE working group with experts from Parties and other stakeholders
-  a virtual marketplace for balanced and documented funding of ACE projects
-  more support of national ACE focal points, especially in developing countries
-  national ACE youth focal points
-  a global platform operated by the UNFCCC linking all ACE-related issues



2.7 Gender

Context: Women³ are more affected by the consequences of the climate crisis because they are already disadvantaged by inequalities. As a result, women are more vulnerable to extreme weather events, famine or other disasters triggered by the climate crisis (Oxfam International 2005). This is especially the case in the Global South. A gender-sensitive and intersectional view still comes far too short in the current climate policy. Yet, diverse perspectives are necessary especially in a complex and multi-layered debate on climate action.



Non-male gender is particularly affected

-  We demand the differing intensity of vulnerability that is influenced by gender to be a major factor in discussions and measures to combat the climate crisis, in particular as the basis of adaptation and L&D processes.
-  We demand that the gender perspective is mainstreamed in all areas of the UNFCCC processes and that the Parties consistently implement it in their national climate policies.
-  We expect the EU to be a strong voice for gender-sensitive climate policy and Germany to support the EU in making a gender perspective visible in the climate processes.
-  We expect Germany to consistently integrate this perspective into its own climate policy at the national level and to clarify it in official documents explicitly.

Quantitative participation of the non-male gender

-  We demand that the composition of those involved in climate politics, as well as the places where external knowledge is used, must be as gender-balanced as possible.
-  We demand to ensure inclusion and engagement of gender experts, including women and gender-related groups, and national gender machineries⁴ while updating and implementing NDCs (see Women Gender Climate 2021).

Fighting male norms as the basis of climate policy

-  We demand for a stronger focus of capacity building to create knowledge and awareness about the entrenchment of masculine norms.
-  We ask the Secretariat to actively intervene in the perpetuation of masculine norms.

³Disclaimer: In this section, as in almost all others, the data basis we refer to is biological sex and thus the division into male and female. When we talk about women here, it is because of the data basis. However, all FLINTA+ persons are affected by discrimination and other disadvantages mentioned.

⁴The term gender machineries usually refers to formal government structures assigned to promote gender equality and/or improve the status and rights of women.

Building expertise in a gender-sensitive way

- 📢 Gender equality should be considered as a cross-cutting element in climate policies, for example by collecting sex and gender disaggregated data in relation to specific sectors in order to inform priority actions (see *ibid.*). We demand that the EU delegation strives in all UNFCCC processes to ensure that the knowledge used is gender sensitive or based on gender sensitive data. Where this is not possible due to lack of data, we expect efforts to close these data gaps as soon as possible.

Progress under the Lima Work Programmes' Gender Action Plan

- 📢 We urge Parties to deliver a strong decision or set of conclusions on pushing forward progress under the Gender Action Plan - to fulfil the ambition set out in Madrid.
- 📢 We support the demands outlined by the Women and Gender Constituency (*ibid.*).

2.8 Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples



Context: Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples are on the frontline of the climate crisis. They are among the first who are and will be affected. Importantly, they are agents of environmental conservation and therefore hold solutions for the climate crisis.

- 📢 We demand that indigenous and local knowledge is consulted in all decision-making and that the results of the recent meetings of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) (UNFCCC 2021e) are recognized and welcomed by COP26.
- 📢 We demand that indigenous and local youth and women are included in activities and work forces of the LCIPP's Facilitative Working Group as active partners and provided with capacity-building and funding.
- 📢 We request Parties to recognize the contributions of indigenous and local communities and ensure their participation in all decision making processes.
- 📢 We demand the EU and Germany to strongly advocate for the recognition and inclusion of local communities and indigenous peoples in international climate policy processes and beyond.

2.9 Matters of Least Developed Countries (LDC)





Context: The United Nations began paying special attention to least developed countries (LDCs) in the late 1960s, recognizing them as the most vulnerable members of the international community. The UNFCCC recognizes LDCs in Article 4, paragraph 9. The Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) was established in 2001, and is currently mandated to provide technical guidance and support to formulate and implement national adaptation plans (NAPs), national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) and the implementation of the LDC work programme, as well as on accessing funding.

- 📢 We urge parties, including the EU and Germany, to provide more resources for the LDC Fund and to agree on additional seats for LDCs in the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG).
- 📢 We call for an extension of the mandate and funding for the LEG.

-  We call for the provision of additional platforms for LDC representatives to integrate their experiences and interests into decision-making.
-  We expect the EU and Germany to politically support LDCs through the named measures.

2.10 Accessibility and inclusivity of the climate negotiations





Context: Due to the current pandemic, accessibility and thus inclusivity of the climate negotiations are even more threatened than they used to be through matters of affordable accommodation, visa etc. The COP26 presidency promised to deliver the 'most inclusive COP ever' (Brooks 2021).

-  We call on the current UK presidency and coming presidencies to ensure that not only plenaries but all negotiations and side events are being translated into the UN languages.
-  We urge Parties to provide funding so that not only the most privileged are able to be involved in the international climate processes.
-  We demand for the provision of badges dedicated to youth-only via YOUNGO, the official youth constituency.
-  We call upon the UNFCCC secretariat, the COP presidency and all Parties that COPs need to be accessible for people with disabilities.




2.11 Post-2021 International Climate processes

Context: The implementation period of the Paris Agreement finally starts in 2022. We need visions for international climate policy and action for the time after COP26.





A new vision for international climate policy

-  The global race towards carbon neutrality must unfold unprecedented actions and leadership.
-  Moving forward in the international processes all commitments made in the Paris Rulebook must be rapidly translated into regional and national regulations.
-  The mechanisms of e.g. Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement and WIM should be used to permanently strengthen international cooperation for climate action.
-  An increased focus should be put on matters of climate justice and adequately dealing with the L&D caused by the climate crisis and on improving the structure, efficiency and effectiveness of the WIM.

Rethink the role of COPs

-  We urge Parties to use the time in between the rounds of the global stocktake and the submission of enhanced NDCs to revise and renew commitments, to identify and close potential gaps in the Paris Rulebook, to put an increased focus on pressing and overlooked issues.
-  We urge Parties to create time and space to foster talks and join forces.
-  We urge Parties to make it a part of the COPs to create a central space where states and other actors present best practice approaches, put forward new concrete pledges and initiatives.

Increased and continuous youth participation

-  We demand to involve youth even more directly into post-2021 policy-making at national, regional and international level.
-  We urge parties to integrate youth into decision-making from the beginning and in a continuous manner, e.g. through international, regional or national advisory councils on NDC enhancement and implementation processes.
-  We demand from the EU and the German Delegation to support greater participation of civil society, in international climate processes, but also on the national and European level leading up to global talks.
-  We demand from COP26 to facilitate inclusivity and accessibility to climate negotiations - now and in the future!

Extended Version

1 Climate action is more urgent than ever

After two years, the global community will finally reassemble at the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP). From October 31 to November 12 2021, governmental representatives, members of civil society, the scientific community and many more will gather in Glasgow in order to tackle the global climate crisis.

Decisions are more urgent than ever as global temperature rise is reaching dangerous levels already. Based on the current emission gap and lack of sufficient policies and actions the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2021) expects the promised limit of ideally 1.5 °C or well below 2 °C to be beyond reach before 2040 – posing existential threats to every region of the world. **But it is not too late – if large-scale reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will be made possible by political will and action – starting immediately.**

Scientific evidence and affected people all over the globe call for **strong, rapid and sustained climate mitigation and adaptation actions now!** Especially the young people demand consequent measures to protect their chance of a dignified life, their liberties and rights.

Parties at COP26 are responsible to answer important questions in consensus for facilitating a just and holistic global transition **to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5 °C and reach carbon neutrality in 2050.** To fulfill this challenge **Parties need to work hand in hand with observer groups.**

2 Our perspective as Klimadelegation e.V.

As a German youth climate organisation, **we unavoidably formulate our position from an European perspective.** Our members are mainly White and have academic backgrounds which influences their perspectives. **We aim to involve diverse considerations but cannot neglect that we view the world through a Western and mainly White lens.** In the quest for climate justice, our group stands in solidarity and support with BIPOC groups and groups from the Global South. **Therefore, do not only read our demands but especially those of more affected groups and people - especially as climate justice is a concept that originates in Southern movements.** the process of writing this position paper we conducted a consultation process with global youth, especially from the Global South. The process aimed to ensure as much as possible that our contents and positions do not contradict or harm the beliefs and demands of vulnerable and marginalised groups.

As a German youth climate organisation **we specifically demand accountability from the German Federal Government and the European Union (EU) for their past and current actions.** While we acknowledge that the climate crisis needs collective action, we underline that especially states with high historic emissions, high levels of wealth and with a large share of current emissions need to show solidarity by delivering their fair share of domestic actions as well as support abroad. For this reason, **the EU and Germany are required to live up to their responsibility.** Europe until the first quarter of the twentieth century has historically been the biggest emitter (Friedlingstein u. a. 2020). Today the EU-27 is still on the third rank of GHG-Emitters (Friedrich u. a. 2020) and **Germany should use its important**

role within the EU to show true leadership with regards to the COP26. On the national level the argument that Germany is a small nation that is only responsible for 2% of global emission is brought forward frequently, attempting to relativize Germany's actual power of action on climate protection. On the contrary, as a wealthy industrial nation Germany stands on rank 6 of the major GHG-emitters world-wide, while our per capita emissions are nearly double than the global average and even higher when emissions from imports are included (Worldometer 2016). This means that **Germany finally needs to become a climate action frontrunner and live up to its international commitments.**

3 Principles for Climate Justice

The overarching goal of Klimadelegation e.V. in international climate politics is climate justice. The concept of climate justice includes dimensions of global, intergenerational equity and social justice. **Currently, the climate crisis deepens intergenerational and social injustices. We demand that this is counteracted by decision makers.**

3.1 The climate crisis: A problem of intergenerational inequity

The climate crisis is a problem marked by temporal interdependencies. The causes and effects are separated by generations, decades, centuries. The same is true for the costs and benefits of avoiding harm. While CO₂-emissions have been released into the atmosphere for more than 250 years, currently young and future generations are disproportionately affected. On top, the planning horizons to tackle the climate crisis often exceed the tenure and sometimes lifespan of decision makers. The global youth, however, is systematically underrepresented in decision-making processes. Therefore, **policies should be implemented with respect to coming generations and long-term planning horizons.**

3.2 No climate justice without social justice

The Global North has excessive historical and current per person emissions, denying the Global South their fair share of atmospheric space. Low-income countries located in the Global South contributed only around 20-30% of cumulative carbon emissions but will bear 90% of the climate crisis' consequences by 2030 according to the Climate Vulnerability Monitor (DARA and Climate Vulnerable Forum 2012: 17 ff.). In contrast, populations of the Global North caused 70-80% of GHG emissions since the beginning of industrialization while they make up only 20% of the historic global population. Therefore, **the Global North has the responsibility to curb emissions earlier and stronger.**

3.3 Break patterns of colonialism and exploitation

Industrialization and carbon-intensive production and consumption are inseparably connected with the history of colonialism and exploitation. Additionally, the current high levels of consumption in the Global North continue to depend on a significant net appropriation from the Global South through unequal exchange, including 10.1 billion tons of embodied raw materials and 379 billion hours of embodied labor per year (Dorninger u.a. 2021). The wealth in the Global North thus relies heavily on patterns of colonization: the appropriation of atmospheric commons, and the appropriation of Southern resources and labour (Hickel 2021). **The current trade system, which is dominated by a small number of high-income countries, reinforces these inequalities in per capita resource use, shifting**

materials from low-income to high-income countries and shifting impacts vice versa. The indebtedness of countries in the Global South and the need for financial support cannot be separated from the imperial appropriation of resources, unequal trade and power relations and the dominance of the Western development model (Sealey-Huggins 2017).







3.4 The climate crisis exacerbates social injustices within countries

It also must be acknowledged that on top of these across-country social inequalities, there are **large within-country social injustices that are being exacerbated by the climate crisis**. The climate crisis and social inequalities are interacting in a 'vicious cycle, whereby initial inequality makes disadvantaged groups suffer disproportionately from the adverse effects of climate change, resulting in greater subsequent inequality' (Islam and Winkel 2017: 3). **Decision-making must consider the interlinkages of inequalities based on demographic characteristics**, such as gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, disabilities and age, inequality regarding assets and income, as well as inequality regarding public decision making (political power) and access to public resources, such as publicly financed health, education, housing, financing, and other services.


The threats posed by the climate crisis are a consequence of unequal, colonial, economic and social power relations. This implies that a climate just future is more than the implementation of climate policies with emission curbing and adaptation measures in technical terms. **In order to achieve the overarching goal of climate justice, a far-reaching reconstruction of power, wealth distribution, society and the economy is required**. This includes the end of all mechanisms of discrimination and suppression. **There is no climate justice without social justice and gender equality**.


3.5 Central Principles to guide climate policy making


The following principles are central to climate policy negotiations at COP26 and beyond. **We demand that decision makers consider the following principles as cornerstones of their policy making and negotiations:**


-  **Representation:** Structurally disadvantaged people, especially those affected by multiple forms of intersectional discrimination, must be explicitly taken into account through measures aimed at proportional and fair representation and by action according to differentiated demands of disadvantaged groups.
 -  **Gender justice** and empowerment of FLINTA persons (women/female, lesbians, inter, trans, agender) as well as LGBTQIA+ rights are central to climate justice.
 -  Representation of **BIPoC** (Black, Indigenous, People of Colour) and prioritizing their rights and demands in negotiations and international decision-making processes.
 -  The same applies to **people with disabilities and otherwise disadvantaged groups**. Information relating to the negotiations, including climate science as well as the negotiation venues must be accessible in order to leave no one behind.
 -  **Youth representation** is especially important due to intergenerational inequity and young and coming generations being disproportionately affected.
-  **Priority in decision-making:** The needs and demands of people most affected by the climate crisis and by structural exploitation must have priority in climate-related decisions. Decisions


must be taken in order to mitigate impacts for the Most Affected People and Areas (MAPA). Global Southern solutions and knowledge systems are to be core to address the climate crisis and climate injustices adequately.


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Equity: Climate policies should counteract neo-colonial exploitation and hierarchical North-South relations and dependencies. Financial assistance should reduce power inequalities rather than reinforce domination. The countries historically more responsible for the climate crisis must compensate affected countries for loss and damage, mitigation and adaptation. The aspect of equity includes **intergenerational equity**. Measures and action are needed today in order to enable a livable future for generations to come.

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Solidarity: Solidarity is especially required as not all people and regions are affected by the climate crisis to the same extent. Decisions must be taken in solidarity with the MAPA and in accordance with their needs and demands. Solidarity has to be intergenerational as well.

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'Polluter Pays' principle: Those responsible for large amounts of emissions and degradation have to bear the costs for the solutions to the damage they caused. The main polluting countries and companies must take financial and social responsibility for mitigation, for phasing out the respective activities and compensating affected countries for loss and damage and adaptation costs. Governments must hold companies accountable.

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'Common but Differentiated Responsibilities' principle: The countries most affected by the climate crisis are the least responsible for it and have often the least resources to adapt. Climate policies and carbon offsetting practices should not be implemented at the expense of people in the Global South. Those with historical and currently high emission levels have to be held accountable.

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Scientific Foundation and Inclusion of Non-Western Knowledge: Scientific findings and especially the IPCC reports must serve as a central basis for decisions. If there is lack of scientific certainty, the precautionary principle needs to be applied. If there is a risk of severe damage to humans or the environment, the absence of conclusive or definite scientific proof must not be a reason for inaction.
 It is important to **include diverse perspectives in scientific analyses** and reports. Scientists from different parts of the world and with different backgrounds, especially from the Global South, must be increasingly represented. This needs to be the case especially in international science-policy interfaces such as the IPCC which currently consists predominantly of white, male and Western members (Mc Sweeney, 2018). In addition to Western-based science, **indigenous and local ecological knowledge** and diverse knowledge systems should be included in the IPCC and as a basis for decision-making. A positive example for a better inclusion of diverse knowledge systems can be found in the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES).

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Holistic approach to tackle multiple crises: The climate crisis, the biodiversity crisis, humanitarian crises, health crises such as pandemics, and economic crises must be tackled holistically and measures must not reinforce other crises. In order to achieve that, global cooperation and collaboration is important. Currently, approaches are failing to account for the complexity of the multifold crisis.

- 📢 Because of the severe **health consequences** of the climate crisis we support the '**One Health**' and '**Planetary Health**' approaches promoting holistic policies for considering jointly human, animal and human health.
- 📢 With the climate crisis being one of the biggest threats to **biodiversity**, solutions to tackle the climate crisis need to consider ecological impacts. The problems of the expanding soil sealing, conflicts over the use of land and the increasing resource consumption need to be addressed.

4 Agenda Items

4.1 Long term targets and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) Enhancement

No more empty targets

To prevent the overshoot of the 1.5 °C limit, global net anthropogenic CO₂ emissions need to decline by about 45% from the 2010 level by 2030, reaching net zero around 2050 (see IPCC 2019). We recognize the pledges for net zero targets around the world. A total of 131 countries have pledged targets for net zero covering approximately 73% of global emissions (Hans u. a. 2021). However setting long-term targets is not sufficient to stay on the narrow but still possible pathway to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees. The real challenge is to solidify these commitments and to implement them. Since the stakes are too high for vague announcements, **we demand that Parties agree on a conclusive and transparent definition of 'net zero' and the scope of emission reductions** (which gases, which sectors, when to be reached, which approach: reduction, removal or offsetting). We demand that net zero targets should include all sectors and gases, especially external ones from aviation and shipping. **Parties also should be required to indicate on what basis they consider their long term targets to be adequate and fair.**

Lastly, **we urge Parties to outline concrete steps, implementation pathways and interim milestones to achieving net zero**, especially through enhanced and comprehensive Nationally Determined Contributions⁵ (Rogelj u. a. 2021). Moreover, we call upon Parties to ensure that commitments are legally binding, regularly reviewed and transparent, as well as aligned with national policies.

Global efforts are still far from enough!

The combined emission reductions by 2030 of the 75 Parties who have submitted their NDCs currently is only 0.5% lower than in 2010 (UNFCCC 2021b). Based on current policies with a probability of 97% we will exceed the global warming limit of 2 °C (Climate Action Tracker 2021d). Even with the help of announced NDCs pledges and net-zero targets we will not stay in this limit with a probability of

⁵NDCs are national/regional post-2020 climate plans by each country to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of the climate crisis as agreed in Paris Agreement Art. 4.2. Parties agreed to enhance their ambitions over time, in order to collectively reach the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. This process is part of the Global Stocktake, which is a mechanism to regularly review and take stock of the progress made in achieving the climate plans, the gaps remaining and the opportunities for increased actions, starting in 2023. Based on the stocktake, Parties to the Paris Agreement are supposed to regularly submit new and updated NDC, starting in 2020 and every five years thereafter (e.g. by 2020, 2025, 2030). In order to enhance the overall ambition over time, successive NDCs are required to represent a progression compared to the previous NDC and reflect its highest possible ambition.

78% (Climate Action Tracker 2021d). This would lead to a global temperature rise of 2.4 °C or even 2.9 °C (Climate Action Tracker 2021a). Some of the biggest emitter countries, for example China, have not yet submitted their new or updated NDC (Climate Action Tracker 2021d). Many other big emitter countries, namely Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland and Vietnam, that have submitted their updated NDCs did not increase their ambitions (Climate Action Tracker 2021d). With each additional decade and even year or month of inaction, these challenges and costs rise and will, at some point, become insurmountable with heating irreversibly locked in to 1.5 or 2 °C and above. At the same time 1.5 °C-compatible pathways have many benefits in terms of avoiding climate-change impacts, as well as cleaner air, increased employment in the renewable energy sector and access to modern energy. Since 'business as usual' politics is no longer an option, particularly the 'big emitter countries' should take the lead in climate action to deliver their fair share of global mitigation efforts. **We demand new and updated NDCs, from all signatories to the Paris Agreement that are consistent with the 1.5 °C limit and fulfill the long-term goals. We demand specifically that historic and current big emitter countries finally fulfill their responsibility and commitment under the Paris Agreement and submit new and updated NDCs with increased ambition and fairness by COP26.**

Comprehensiveness of NDCs

We strongly believe that the text in Article 3 and 4.1 of the Paris Agreement establishes that the NDCs as main vehicles under the Paris agreement serve the purpose of the entire Article 2 (UNFCCC 2015a). For this reason, **NDCs should also make clear references to countries' adaptation efforts, measures to build resilience and actions to support adaptation and loss and damage in developing countries. NDC should include mitigation-adaptation co-benefit and include reference to achieving finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development implemented.** In case countries choose a variety of different policy vehicles e.g. to address adaptation. **Clear links should be made between the actions outlined in NDCs and other policy documents and strategies.** Art. 2 of the Paris Agreement also states that the agreement should be implemented in a way that reflects equity and the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC) (ibid.). This includes clear references to these values in the NDCs and a commitment to the fair share of countries (Climate Action Tracker 2021c).

The EU NDC

We criticize that components on adaptation and mitigation-adaptation co-benefits have so far been categorized as 'not applicable' in the EU NDC (see page 10 and 14 of EU NDC). Furthermore, the EU's fairness considerations have to be reconsidered and substantiated. The baseline of merely referring to the 2050 climate neutrality target as being a globally fair contribution is insufficient. According to the Climate Action Tracker 2021b: 'the EU's climate commitment in 2030 is not consistent with holding warming to below 2 °C, let alone limiting it to 1.5 °C as required under the Paris Agreement, and is instead consistent with warming between 2 °C and 3 °C. If all countries were to follow the EU's approach, warming would reach over 2 °C and up to 3 °C. This means the EU's climate commitment is at the least stringent with what would be a fair share of global effort'. **To increasingly achieve climate targets all member states of the EU should implement the 'fit for 55%' programme in their national policies.** Furthermore, Europe as part of the Global North and a former colonizer continues to profit from neo-colonial continuities in economic structures which is a main reason for the accumulated wealth. As the EU is historically responsible for a major share of GHG emissions, they have a special responsibility

towards countries of the Global South. **Therefore, EU emission reduction pathways need to be much steeper in order to be compatible with the principle of climate justice in order to mitigate global inequalities. Germany should put sufficient policies in place to achieve the 1.5 °C limit and serve as a leader within the EU and for all the 'big emitter countries' especially in their role in the G7 presidency in 2022 to drive a radical change towards more climate action.**

Common Timeframes for the implementation of the NDCs

Decision 6/CMA.1, paragraph 2, refers to Art. 4 paragraph 10 of the Paris Agreement notes that Parties 'shall apply common time frames to their nationally determined contributions to be implemented from 2031 onward' (UNFCCC 2019: 17). **We demand that the Parties agree to a singular five-year common time frame for the implementation of NDCs.** If Parties follow different implementation logics this would lead to lack of accountability, lack of transparency, lack of comparability and lack of effectiveness.

The general ambition raising cycles of the Paris Agreement ambition including the Global Stocktake, underlies a 5 year timeline, therefore the implementation cycles should comply with this. Limiting the implementation periods of NDCs at the national level to five years also enables countries to respond more quickly to scientific findings and economic and technological changes. Furthermore five year common time frames allow for a maximum ambition, accountability and comparability of NDCs. They best account for the principle of progression over time as established in Paris Agreement Art. 4 Paragraph 3 (UNFCCC 2015a). On top of that, only five year timeframes sense the urgency of the climate crisis.

The Global Stocktake

The first global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement (GST) evaluating the implementation progress of the Paris Agreement is beginning at the moment and will be completed in 2023, in time for COP28 (see UNFCCC n.d.). However, the process as designed so far is not as open and inclusive as we wish it would be. **Non-party stakeholders and observer organisations should be able to participate in a more substantial way: They should be able to give input to the GST and should be included in the succeeding discussions (Climate Action Network 2021b). Input should be accepted in different languages, at least in the official UNFCCC languages, and information relating to Loss & Damage should be explicitly asked for.**

The GST should not only consist of quantitative but also qualitative inputs, best practices, lessons learned, success stories and gaps. Furthermore, the financial and staff capacities of the Secretariat should increase to accompany the process more comprehensively and provide more support, e.g. for Global South organisations.

Practical Steps Towards more ambitious NDCs

We urge every country to decarbonise their economy as well as every societal sector. To avoid severe climate consequences, net zero targets should include all sectors and gases, especially external ones from aviation and shipping. Furthermore, all countries must cancel their coal construction plans as well as their plans for a new gas pipeline now. **To stay reach a 1.5 degree conform pathway we demand that global coal emissions should peak in 2020, global coal use in electricity generation must fall by 80% below 2010 levels by 2030, all OECD nations, including Germany should end**

coal use entirely by 2030, and all coal-fired power stations must be shut by 2040 at the latest (Ganti o.D.). At the same time a gas phase out as soon as possible is inevitable. To reduce energy-related CO₂ emissions by at least 70% until 2050 compared to current levels, we demand for a large-scale shift to electricity from renewables, for heating and transport, as well as starkly increased energy efficiency (IRENA 2019).

Additionally, every country must step up their investments in green hydrogen and the divestment of fossil fuels. Moreover the states should publish their plan for sufficient international climate finance, which is a cornerstone to implement climate actions globally.

4.2 Adaptation


Adaptation Action

We support the increasing emphasis on **locally led adaptation**. This needs to be driven by the most-vulnerable communities and encourage local leadership. **Adaptation actions should be gender- transformative, human-rights based and people-centered, especially taking into account the needs of the most vulnerable populations** (women, other minority genders and children) taking into account their protection needs and sexual reproductive health and rights. As reportedly highlighted by many countries, especially from the Global South, **more discussion is needed on how to improve access to funding, capacity, technology and information at the lowest appropriate level**. Particularly, financial support for both the planning and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAP) remains critical and the problem of accessing resources of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has not been resolved by interim measures. **We demand that Parties agree on concrete ways to accelerate adaptation action, for instance through a task force on NAPs to tackle some of the main challenges currently faced by state and civil stakeholders.**

Monitoring and Evaluation of progress towards Global Goal on Adaptation



A review process of the Global Goal on Adaptation⁶ will be part of the first Global Stocktake that is meant to take place in 2022-23. Currently the Adaptation Committee⁷ is in a dialogue process about a technical paper outlining how to monitor and evaluate (M&E) the progress towards the GGA.

From our perspective, three considerations are important:

-  Due to its objective to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience, real progress towards GGA can only be measured by engaging those most vulnerable. Therefore **it is crucial to design the M&E as a participatory approach with strong people-centered thinking**. Furthermore, it is crucial to account for locally led adaptation principles. Progress in increasing the adaptive capacity and resilience of people and ecosystems depends on local contexts and situations. Using **local goals on adaptation should guide all work on M&E of progress towards the GGA.**

⁶In Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, a global goal on adaptation (GGA) has been defined that aims at a) enhancing adaptive capacity and resilience and b) reducing vulnerability, with a view to contributing to sustainable development; c) ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the goal of holding average global warming well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to hold it below 1.5 °C.





⁷Installed as executive organ as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework

-  Other than mitigation, adaptation progress is not always easily quantifiable. The metrics and parameters currently proposed by the Adaptation Committee can help to make some adaptation dimensions comprehensive, but they might not provide sufficient background to explain why certain progress has been made (or not). It is important to understand synergies with regards to the multiple effects of the climate crisis on the earth system as well as target-conflicts of adaptation measures. Therefore, **to understand the real impact of different adaptation enhancing activities and resources by regional, national or local entities, a larger variety of quantitative and qualitative methods needs to be used. We suggest large-scale processes of knowledge sharing, information gathering and learning about adaptation progress, such as stakeholder dialogues with and targeted surveys with government institutions.**
-  Given that current mitigation efforts lack behind its requirements and the system response to the climate crisis is just slowly being discovered, the progress towards GGA cannot be only evaluated with regards to a future of 1.5 or 2°C temperature rise. Progress on adaptation always depends on progress in mitigation and possible additional co-benefits. The **progress should therefore be evaluated in the context of the current climate crisis expectations to avoid overestimations.**

Foster informed decisions on adaptation actions and measures through the Nairobi Work Programme

In 2021, the Nairobi Work Programme⁸ (NWP) is undergoing a stocktaking process. **We demand that this process should be accompanied by a submission process to allow inputs from different stakeholders facilitated through guiding questions, indicators to track concrete success and dialogues (possibly regional) with experts and civil society in the run up to SBSTA56. We highlight that inclusivity, accessibility and transparency must be imperative both to the preparation and conduction of the NWP stocktake.** We highlight the need to incorporate a broad range of actors, especially users of knowledge products. We request the inclusion of indigenous and local knowledge, on-the-ground CSOs (Civil Society Organisations), partner organizations and marginalized groups such as women, children and youth. Their engagement and input on experiences of working with Parties through the NWP should be proactively promoted.

Possible components for assessing the effectiveness and performance of the stocktake from our view could be:

-  How accessible are the products of the NWP? Who is engaging with the NWP? Are most vulnerable communities indeed reached by the efforts of the NWP?
-  In concrete terms, how and to what extent did the NWP contribute to building knowledge and capacities of the most vulnerable populations in LDCs and SIDS?
-  How is the NWP contributing to drafting and implementing NAPs and the GGA?
-  How well is the cooperation working between the NWP, the AC, the LEG (Least Developed Countries Expert Group) and other institutions?

⁸NWP has been mandated during COP11 and mainly supports adaptation action by enhancing knowledge transfer and stakeholder/expert interaction. According to UNFCCC (2021), 'the Nairobi work programme (NWP) strives to assist all Parties, in particular [least and small island] developing countries, [...] to improve their understanding and assessment of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, and to make informed decisions on practical adaptation actions and measures'.

Human Mobility as an adaptation strategy

The climate crisis is highly linked with different forms of human mobility such as migration, displacement, and planned relocation. The concrete mobility responses to the increasing environmental stressors are context-specific and depend on economic, social, political, and demographic aspects. Movements are typically multi-causal which makes it very difficult to identify the climate crisis as a primary driver for migration. Therefore, estimates for the number of climate migrants vary greatly from 25 million to about 1 billion migrants by 2050 (International Organization for Migration 2014). The growing importance of climate related human mobility makes common responses to the climate crisis and migration necessary. In the last decade, the importance of human mobility within the UNFCCC process has increased, especially in the negotiations about loss and damage but is not sufficiently considered regarding adaptation strategies. Therefore, **we demand that Parties acknowledge human mobility as a necessary adaptation strategy.**

The climate crisis will affect human mobility in different ways. It will increase the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and weather-related natural disasters leading to higher risks of humanitarian emergencies. Rising sea levels will make coastal areas and low-lying islands uninhabitable. The negative effects of the climate crisis will increase food insecurity, reduce water availability, and exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities. Higher competition over shrinking resources increases the probability of armed conflicts and further forced displacement (ibid.).

In some contexts, migration can constitute an important and positive adaptation strategy that should be supported by policy actions (ibid.). Mobility can save lives, enhance resilience, and reduce risks. However, in other contexts, human mobility makes people more vulnerable and exposes them to new risks. **Policy responses, including national adaptation plans, should therefore incorporate the different contexts and types of human mobility.**

Most importantly, adaptation plans should reduce the pressure on populations at risk to avert displacement and avoid the need for planned relocation. When planned relocation is unavoidable, its scale should be minimized and must always involve the participation of the affected communities. Moreover, capacities to address migration, displacement and planned relocation need to be enhanced and human mobility should be dealt with as a core element of adaptation strategies in national adaptation programmes. Additionally, it is important to build institutions and frameworks that broaden the criteria for refugees to enable affected people to have a valid claim for refugee status and to facilitate cross-border human mobility that reduces risks and vulnerabilities for migrants.

4.3 Loss and Damage

Big Emitters' financial liability for damages caused by fossil fuel consumption!

Loss and Damage (L&D) refers to adverse effects of the climate crisis, both due to sudden onset events (like extreme weather events) and slow onset processes (like rising sea levels). L&D is an issue of climate justice, because the **most affected countries and communities often have the least emissions and also the least resources to build resilience** towards the negative effects of the climate crisis. Climate justice requires large emitters to support those most affected and pay reparations for the damages caused by their fossil fuel consumption.

Small Island and Least Developed states (SIDS and LDC) have been arguing for **financial liability and compensation**, which was denied by developed countries. Instead, the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD) has been endorsed in Madrid to provide technical support under the Warsaw International Mechanism on L&D (WIM) which so far merely focuses on research and dialogue (UNFCCC o.D.(b)).

The current financial needs for L&D in the Global South are estimated to be in the hundred billions, increasing annually (Schäfer u. a. 2019: 8). We demand that these needs are met by Parties, in accordance with the Polluters Pay principle, by making **available adequate and needs-based public finance for vulnerable countries and communities. The funding for L&D has to be added to existing finance pledges**, e.g. for mitigation and adaptation.

Youth has to be a vital part of all discussions on L&D, e.g. via a climate reparations task force (Loss and Damage Youth Coalition 2019), since it is the young and future generations who will be affected most by the increasing frequency and intensity of climate impacts.

The Santiago Network must be fully operationalized at COP26!

For COP26, we urge the parties to fully operationalize the Santiago Framework (SNLD), i.e. with its own secretariat and funding. We support the demands and suggestions put forward by the cross constituency call for action: **'Parties must ensure that the SNLD delivers functions that are based on the most prevalent challenges and gaps that developing countries face, including a lack of capacity, and a lack of finance and support'** (Climate Action Network 2021a). **We suggest mandating an annual Technical Expert Meeting on L&D at the intersessional negotiations**, similar to the TEM-A for the issue of addressing adaptation, to inform the activities of the SNLD. It should be mandated to assist in accessing finance for L&D (ex-ante and ex-post), in particular marginalized populations and those who lack the means to make formal claims (see *ibid.*).

Strengthen the Warsaw International Mechanism for more transparency and accountability

Furthermore, **the mandate of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) has to be strengthened**. Its facilitating and capacity-building efforts have to be increased and institutional arrangements enhanced. We demand that Parties commission the Executive Committee of the WIM to compile an bi-annual report on the current L&D finance gap that should offer the necessary transparency on the L&D finance gap. **L&D has to become a permanent agenda item in all rounds of negotiation** to ensure that it does not continue to be side-lined in decision making processes.

Time to address all losses and damages!

Besides the structural aspects, our approach towards L&D has to become more comprehensive. **We demand that non-financial losses**, e.g. loss of culture and knowledge, human death and suffering, as well as migration due to climate change **have to become a core component of L&D considerations. Slow onset processes have to have to be addressed more prominently in the political discussions as they are responsible for immense L&D.**

4.4 Climate Finance

Increase Climate Finance, reach \$100 billion and more!

We emphasize the historic responsibility of the Global North to contribute financially to the mitigation and adaptation costs in the Global South and the most affected countries without using financial assistance as a mechanism of domination or oppression. For that reason, **we demand increased climate finance from additional public and private sources, excluding loans with unproportionally high interest rates. We urge Parties to finally meet and exceed the \$100 billion by this year's COP26. According to the OECD, Parties are far from reaching that goal (OECD 2016). We request the German Government to increase their public climate finance to their fair share of \$8 Mrd. per year (OECD o.D.).** Further, the \$100 billion goal has to be considered as a minimum. Based on the fact alone that, according to the IPCC 2018 Summary for Policymakers, 2.4 trillion dollars will be needed only to restructure the energy system (IPCC 2018). Since adaptation costs and payments accounting for losses and damages are not included it can be assumed that considerably more money will be needed than agreed to mobilize. The current state of climate finance reveals a funding gap on L&D and adaptation (United Nations Environment Programme 2021). **We demand that the financial resources for mitigation and adaptation must be equally balanced.** However, this is not to be achieved by simply shifting the financial resources, but through additional public and private funds. Financial resources could be generated through taxes on polluting goods or by ending subsidies for fossil fuels, and directing the proceeds to address climate crisis mitigation, adaptation and L&D.

Make climate finance reliable, predictable and fair!

These **financial measures can under no circumstances exacerbate the debt burden emerging countries are already carrying today. Reliability and predictability in the financing provided by industrialized nations must be ensured:** Transparent information on the amount of funding (PA Art 9.5) by developed countries and uncomplicated applications to funding are important (PA Art 9.7) (UNFCCC 2015a: 8). Therefore, **we demand that the EU develops rules for long-term climate financing.** Moreover, to effectively put a climate finance system into place, **a globally agreed definition of climate finance is necessary, especially to differentiate it from so-called development finance⁹. Transparency in reporting on climate finance needs to increase in terms of the composition of existing and additional payments. Moreover, we call for an increase of climate finance after the expiration of the current goals in 2025,** based on a realistic estimate of costs for mitigation and adaptation efforts, as well as addressing losses and damages.

Climate finance must serve global climate justice!

Climate finance must serve global climate justice, enhance equality and eliminate discrimination of any kind. This includes not supporting large corporations that reproduce colonial exploitation of nature and people. Instead, **climate finance should contribute to reducing inequalities and empower disadvantaged populations by financial redistribution on a global level.** For example, bilateral finance for renewable energy transition in countries of the Global South should be based on the aim to emancipate these countries in their pathway to low carbon development. Europe has a special responsibility due to its colonial and economic history, which in our view is not yet acted upon enough. In addition, so-called **climate debts in the sense of an overuse of emissions and climate damage**

⁹So called development finance is to be viewed critically, since through this term a western-dominated model is being generalized which reinforces a neocolonial world order.

caused by the Global North to the Global South must be compensated.

The climate finance mechanisms should be gender-responsive and human-rights based. That means they should contribute to poverty reduction and the empowerment of women and minorities. **We are calling on parties that efforts should be made in order to make the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism more accessible, inclusive and transparent, including through furthering engagement with observers,** such as at SCF's annual forum (the only forum of a financial mechanism under the convention that engages stakeholders at all levels), as well as sharing more documents with observers and allowing them further time and space to provide written inputs.

Private sector climate finance needs to increase, divestment from fossil fuels is overdue!

Moreover, **we demand from private actors** like investment banks and other private investors, as well as so-called development banks, **that they significantly increase their climate finance portfolio and invest in climate crisis mitigation and adaptation, as well as in dealing with losses and damages.**

We also demand banks at the same time divest from fossil fuels and from any activity dealing with neo-colonial extractivism of resources including metals and minerals and support a just and fair energy transition instead. Private actors must raise internal awareness through climate education for employees. **We encourage related bodies like the SCF, GCF, GEF to host public-private dialogues with private finance players to explore synergies. We call for an immediate end to investments in fossil fuels and for the redistribution of funds in favor of climate-friendly investments.**

Bounce back better and greener!

A final important point for climate finance is the financing of a just and green recovery from the pandemic. As destructive and harmful COVID-19 has been for many people and countries around the world, the pandemic as a moment of disturbance can also be seen as a possible turning point for a greener and more sustainable future. **We as societies should not just recover to 'same business as usual', but bounce back better and greener.** This concerns all parts of public life, including financing and political recovery measures, city and regional planning, personal health, labor, production and consumption systems, international relationships, and much more. Germany and the European Union deploy huge financial packages to support the economic recovery (Wuppertal Institute and E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism o.D.). **We demand from governments that all financing is in the sense of climate protection, just and green transitions.**

We urge that guidelines for green recovery are developed globally, while countries in the Global North must take the lead in providing just green investments and transforming their way of production and consumption. Countries of the Global South should be integrated and supported in the process of finding solutions to building and bouncing back better.

We demand that countries agree on a regular, transparent and long-term documentation of the global progress of green recovery. We call for COP26 to advocate that all recovery actions after the pandemic must be in line with the Paris Agreement.

4.5 Article 6

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows for cooperation to achieve NDCs and establishes bilateral and multilateral market-based cooperation mechanisms (Article 6.2 and 6.4) and a non-market mechanism under Article 6.8 (UNFCCC 2015a: 4 f.).

Market mechanisms under Article 6 have been subject to sharp criticisms especially from environmental defenders in the Global South because they fail to address unequal power relations and could shift responsibility from the Global North to the Global South. Article 6 could allow for the commodification of commons and the enclosure of nature (ibid.). This would represent a continuity of colonial appropriation, accumulation and domination of the Global South. Therefore, we support the fundamental critique of market mechanisms.

However, we see the need to constructively engage in the conversation about Article 6. We demand that Article 6 at least ensures (1) human rights and sustainable development, (2) environmental integrity and (3) adaptation finance.

Human rights and sustainable development



We demand that Article 6 projects do not contribute to human and especially indigenous rights violations. This could happen, e.g., by displacement of indigenous peoples through the construction of dams. Furthermore, Article 6 explicitly promotes sustainable development. Diverse and indigenous approaches instead of generalized and imposed solutions that reproduce problematic patterns need to be included holistically in project plans from early on. Specifically, **we call for the active participation of indigenous communities and local populations in project development.**





In addition, there is a need for contractually stipulated respect for human rights as well as the establishment of a transparent, independent, fair, accessible, legitimate and human rights-based complaints mechanism. This could be in the context of Safeguards and Safeguard Information Systems; examples from the UNFCCC context include the Warsaw Framework for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) (UNFCCC o.D.[a]).

Environmental integrity

Market mechanisms carry the risk of only hot air being sold and emissions increasing instead of decreasing. To avoid this, **environmental integrity must be taken seriously so that Article 6 can substantially contribute to a below 1.5 °C world.** Market mechanisms should not only be understood as offsetting mechanisms by individuals, companies and states because maximum efforts to reduce emissions in all places are needed as fast as possible.

All requirements formulated here for Article 6 must apply to the bilateral mechanisms under Art. 6.2 as well as to the multilateral ones under Art. 6.4. The following requirements are necessary:

-  **No double counting of emission reductions** - Traded emission reductions may only be counted against the NDCs of the buying party (keyword: 'corresponding adjustments').
-  **No trading of savings that would have been realized anyway** - Article 6 should only make 'high-hanging fruits' tangible.

-  **Avoid that countries keep their NDCs artificially low** in order to be able to sell more emissions.
-  Baselines must be set in a **fair, transparent and ambitious** manner.
-  **A smooth transition from the Clean Development Mechanism** to the market mechanisms under article 6 must be ensured.
-  **Market mechanisms under 6.2 and 6.4 must contribute to the Overall Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (OMGE)**, which is why we demand that 50% of traded emissions certificates will be set-aside ('cancellation rate').

In summary, **all market mechanisms should be subject to strict regulations**. The San Jose Principles already offer a good start. However, there are still too many issues of environmental integrity at this stage.

Non-market mechanisms

Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement provides non-market-based mechanisms for cooperation in achieving NDCs without trading emission allowances. Against the background of critique of market mechanisms, **we explicitly welcome Article 6.8**. However, the concrete design of this Article is unclear at this point. **We therefore call for specific non-market cooperation under Article 6.8 to contribute to additional climate finance and in particular adaptation finance. Article 6.8 should actively promote synergies with other sustainability goals**, for example by supporting nature-based solutions.

Adaptation funding

Article 6.6 seeks to ensure that 'a portion of the proceeds from activities under the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 shall be used to cover administrative costs as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to bear the costs of adaptation.'

As the climate crisis impacts especially the Global South already, adaptation finance is of substantial importance for climate justice. **We therefore call for at least 10 % of the proceeds from carbon credits issued for Art. 6.2 or Art. 6.4 project activity as well as the surpluses from administrative expenditures, to be channelled into adaptation finance.**

4.6 Action for Climate Empowerment

Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) and all six elements of the Doha Work Programme (DWP) (education, training, public access to information, public awareness, public participation, and international cooperation) are key for democratic and inclusive climate action (UNFCCC 2012: 6 f.).

Towards an enhanced work program

We appreciate the detailed review of the Doha Work Programme in 2020 (UNFCCC 2021d). COP26 has to build on the SBI Chair's and the SBI Co-Facilitator's informal note to include stakeholder's inputs in the continuation and improvement of the Work Programme (UNFCCC 2021a). **We expect strategies for engaging sub-national ACE actors too, especially from vulnerable and marginalized communities (see *ibid*).**

The new work program preferably follows an 8-year timeframe with a mid-term review in coherence with existing international programmes (e.g. the SDGs and NDCs) so all relevant information will be present for upcoming decisions in 2030 (Caprini u. a. o.D.: 12).







National plans and binding goals should be substantiated with internationally agreed upon metrics for tracking implementation and reporting progress (ibid.: 7). **We demand ACE to be a cross-cutting priority in climate policy and action - facilitated by more national institutional coordination.**

Harmonizing a long-term vision and short-term for multi-level ACE

Regarding ACE in general, **we support a long-term vision which is underlined by short-term action plans that work towards transformational capacity building, science-based approaches, and human rights orientation** (UNFCCC 2021b: 2). Beyond national measures, international and regional norms and regulations should set the floor for ACE activities. For example, a European action plan can efficiently allocate resources across borders and strengthen multinational ambition.

We appreciate the initiative of a European Climate Pact (European Commission 2020). **We demand that EU institutions and organizations make an effort to harmonize existing programs on EU-level with national and international programs to achieve a wider impact.**

At all levels of engagement and discussion, youth should be intentionally included in ACE processes. We acknowledge the success of the ACE Youth Forum 2021, which resulted in innovative ideas (ACE Youth Forum 2021):

-  an action plan for the next ACE work program.
-  an ACE task force with experts from Parties and Non-Party Stakeholders.
-  a virtual marketplace for balanced funding of ACE projects and monitoring financial flows.
-  support for ACE National Focal Points.
-  national ACE Youth Focal Points.
-  a global platform hosted by the UNFCCC that connects all ACE-related issues.

At COP26 we expect Parties to decide on what to include in a **new Work Program** and to **engage observer organizations** in building the future of Action for Climate Empowerment as we are and stand for the people to be empowered.

4.7 Gender

A gender-sensitive and intersectional view still comes far too short in the current climate policy. Yet, diverse perspectives are necessary especially in a complex and multi-layered debate on climate action.

The climate crisis is a crisis of social injustice, as it entrenches and reinforces existing injustices. The globally and structurally prevailing discrimination against the non-male gender is one of those. It is therefore elementary that climate policy takes into account the gender perspective and always checks

the effects of measures for their gender sensitivity. **We therefore demand that Parties at COP26 reaffirm their commitment 'when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider [...] gender equality [and] empowerment of women'** (UNFCCC 2015b: 2).

Non-male gender is particularly affected by the climate crisis

Women¹⁰ are more affected by the consequences of the climate crisis because they are already disadvantaged by inequalities. As a result, women are more vulnerable to extreme weather events, famine or other disasters triggered by the climate crisis (Oxfam International 2005). This is especially the case in the Global South. Here women are often at the end of the information chain; girls are the first to be taken out of school when money decreases due to crop failures and are responsible to take care of children and the vulnerable when they flee (Nellemann u. a. 2011). As a consequence, **we demand that the differing intensity of vulnerability that is influenced by the gender of people must be a major factor in the discussion and the ultimate measures to combat the climate crisis.** In particular, this must be the basis of all measures in climate adaptation and L&D processes.

We demand that the gender perspective is mainstreamed in all areas of the UNFCCC processes and that the Parties consistently implement this in their national climate policies. We expect the EU to be a strong voice for gender-sensitive climate policy and Germany to support the EU in making a gender perspective visible in the climate processes. In addition, we expect Germany to consistently integrate gender-sensitivity into its own climate policy and to make the connection with this perspective explicitly clear in their official documents.

Quantitative participation of the non-male Gender

Women are quantitatively less involved in climate processes. As the current gender composition report by the UNFCCC secretariat shows, women occupy on average only 33% of all positions in the consultative bodies. There is no Party Delegation where women account for more than 43% of heads and deputy heads in any age group (UNFCCC 2021c). This refers to both the UNFCCC and other climate policy processes and to the experts or the organisations from which the knowledge is generated that is drawn upon in the processes. As the climate crisis affects the broader society, their perspectives must also be represented in the UNFCCC processes. **We demand that the composition of those involved in the climate policy process, as well as the places where external knowledge is used, must be as gender-balanced as possible. The inclusion and engagement of gender experts, including women and gender-related groups, and national gender machineries (McBride u. a. 2011)¹¹ must be ensured,** for example while updating and implementing NDCs (Women Gender Climate 2021).

Fighting male norms as the basis for climate policy

We live in a society that is patriarchal. This pattern of thinking is reflected everywhere in our society, in our actions and of course also in our climate policy. For a change, which we have to initiate with the fight against the climate crisis, we also need to rethink this point. We need to question to what extent our standard, our normal is shaped by patriarchal thought patterns and actively work to dismantle

¹⁰Disclaimer: In this section, as in almost all others, the data basis we refer to is biological sex and thus the division into male and female. When we talk about women here, it is because of the data basis. However, all FLINTA+ persons are affected by discrimination and other disadvantages mentioned.

¹¹The term gender machineries usually refers to formal government structures assigned to promote gender equality and/or improve the status and rights of women.

them. In order to mainstream gender and gender critical norms in all areas of international climate policy, it is important **to create knowledge and awareness about the entrenchment of masculine norms. Therefore, a stronger focus on capacity building is needed at this point. This also includes the Secretariat actively intervening to counter the perpetuation of masculine norms.**

Building expertise in a gender-sensitive way

Knowledge, which forms the basis for our climate policy measures, must be diverse and must not arise purely from male perspectives. If the basis for decisions is based on the realities of men's lives or the data used is not collected and analysed in a gender-sensitive way, there is a risk of further entrenching gender-blind policies and measures. All stakeholders must constantly and permanently strive to base decisions on the broadest and most diverse data possible. For this, efforts are important to adapt the existing data basis and to promote gender-sensitive data collection in case of data gaps. **Gender equality should be considered as a cross-cutting element in climate policies, for example by collecting sex and gender disaggregated data in relation to specific sectors to inform priority actions (WGG2021). We demand that the EU delegation strives in all UNFCCC processes to ensure that used knowledge is gender sensitive or based on gender sensitive data. Where this is not possible due to lack of data, we expect efforts to close these data gaps as soon as possible.**

Progress under the Lima Work Programmes' Gender Action Plan

A key outcome of COP25 was the adoption of the updated 5-year Gender Action Plan (GAP). We demand that the Lima Work Programme is implemented consistently. To accelerate progress towards the GAP, COP26 must deliver decisions or conclusions on pushing progress. We support the demands outlined by the Women and Gender Constituency (WGC), including that Parties finalize the in-session workshop on the role of National Gender and Climate Change Focal Points (NGCCFPs) to set out a structure for the GAP review in 2022, guidance to integrate a gender perspective into constituted body processes and a review on the inclusion of gender considerations in new and updated NDCs. We support that the GAP will be linked across all areas of decision-making at COP26 (WGG2021).

4.8 Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples

Local Communities and Indigenous People (LCIP) are on the frontline of the climate crisis. They are among the first who are already and will increasingly be affected by changes in the climate. Importantly, indigenous people are agents of environmental conservation and therefore hold a lot of solutions for the crisis we are in as a humanity, e.g. on adaptation strategies.

We demand that indigenous and local ecological knowledge is consulted in all decision making processes and that the results of the recent meetings of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) are recognized and welcomed by COP26 (UNFCCC 2021e). Furthermore, we demand that indigenous youth and women are included in activities and work forces of the Facilitative Working Group of the LCIPP as active partners and provided with capacity-building and funding.

Parties must **recognize the contributions of indigenous and local communities and ensure their empowerment and participation in all decision making processes.** This includes overcoming the language barrier in international processes for indigenous people. **Professional interpretation needs**

to be provided at all sessions. **We demand the EU and Germany to strongly advocate for the recognition and inclusion of local communities and indigenous peoples in the international climate policy processes and beyond.**

4.9 Matters of Least Developed Countries

On matters of Least Developed Countries (LDC) **we urge parties to provide more resources for the LDC Fund and to agree on additional seats for LDCs in the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG).** Furthermore, we call for an extension of the mandate and funding for the LEG. In addition, LDC representatives should be provided with platforms to integrate their experiences and ideas into decision-making as they are the one's most impacted by those decisions and hold local knowledge for solutions. We request the EU and Germany to strongly support these measures politically and financially.

4.10 Post-2021 International Climate processes

Accessibility and inclusivity of the climate negotiations

Due to the current pandemic, accessibility and thus inclusivity of the climate negotiations are even more urgent than they used to be. Although the COP26 presidency promised the 'most inclusive COP ever' (Brooks 2021), entry into the UK will be difficult, especially for people from Global South countries who are mostly on the UK COVID red list and require quarantine (UN COP26 2021).

We strongly criticize that COPs continue to fail being inclusive in terms of language. Many of those most marginalized - if they make it to the COP - struggle with **language barriers**, e.g. indigenous people representatives from Latin America. **We call on the current UK presidency and the coming presidencies to ensure that not only plenaries but all negotiations and side events are translated into the UN languages.**

The UK still has to deliver concepts on the following problems: attendance of people without vaccination, tests, quarantine (and its financial and temporal costs), affordable accommodation, visa etc. Additionally easy tests on-site must be provided (Brooks 2021).

Youth participation is not only a matter of representation but of inclusion and accessibility. Youth climate advocates mainly engage voluntarily and are students, many work but can't afford to take time off to participate or participate and don't have time to work. This creates a disadvantage for youth in contrast to many other actors who are sent and paid by institutions. When youth representatives from every country in the world, especially the Global South, are supposed to participate, **we urge Parties to fund us so not only the most privileged are able to take part in international climate processes. Additionally, badges dedicated to youth-only** need to be provided via YOUNGO, the official youth constituency.

We call upon the UNFCCC secretariat, the COP presidency and all Parties that COPs need to be accessible for people with disabilities. This includes guiding systems for the blind, sign language in all events and additional badges for assistance persons.

A new vision for international climate policy

The implementation period of the Paris Agreement finally starts in 2022. We need visions for international climate policy and action for the time after COP26. Parties must recognize that carbon neutrality by 2050, a 1.5 °C-consistent pathway and a climate-resilient future can only be achieved through on-going global and joint efforts. **The global race towards Paris integrity must unfold unprecedented actions and leadership.**

Moving forward in the international processes, all commitments made in the Paris Rulebook must be rapidly translated into regional and national regulations. The mechanisms of e.g. Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement and WIM should be used to permanently strengthen international cooperation for climate action. Efficiency and effectiveness of mechanisms must be ensured through transparency, accountability, clear targets, monitoring and reporting, and measurement with indicators.

Matters of climate justice and L&D must be focused increasingly as well as improving the structure, efficiency and effectiveness of the WIM.

Rethink the role of COPs

We are convinced that **the time in between the rounds of the global stocktake and the submission of enhanced NDCs must be used to revise and renew commitments, to identify and close potential gaps in the Paris Rulebook, to put an increased focus on pressing and overlooked issues** such as the future of climate finance, adaptation, disaster risk management, L&D, speeding up the global renewable energy transition, low-carbon development, global innovation and technology transfer in a way that doesn't create new dependencies but rather supports emancipation of countries in the Global South.

Time and space need to increase for bilateral meetings, coalitions, partnerships, supra-regional networks, UNFCCC subsidiary body meetings and input from civil society, particularly youth, science and the private actors like think tanks **to foster talks and join forces.** We propose for **COPs to create a central space where states and other actors present best practices, put forward new pledges and initiatives.**

Increased and continuous youth participation

Under the premise of ACE, **youth needs to be even more directly involved in post-2021 policy-making at the national, regional and international level.** We don't want any more youth summits where young people merely talk amongst themselves. Having a seat at the table does not mean being seated at a separate 'kids' table. Involvement neither means to just be invited when most decisions are already taken, **we rather urge parties to integrate youth into decision making processes from the beginning and in a continuous manner,** for example in the international, regional or national advisory councils on NDC enhancement and implementation. There are many young people in YOUNGO who can serve as experts in their respective fields and who are ready to give their input and feedback.

We demand from the EU and the German Delegation to support greater participation of civil society in international climate policy, but also on national and European levels leading up to global talks. Young people are the ones that will live with the future we are creating now, so they must take part in decision-making. We demand from COP26 to facilitate inclusivity and accessibility of

climate negotiations - now and in the future.

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